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INTRODUCTION
"Let the seed be exhaustless, let life never run out," stated Vandana Shiva
in her keynote address at the 2009 Organicology Conference in Portland, Oregon.
The conference marked the first bi-annual gathering of the organic food and
farming sector to discuss a sustainable food future.2 Dr. Shiva, along with a
growing number of scholars, believes the seed is in danger of commercial
monopoly, thereby depriving the public of food resources, plant genetic diversity,
and centuries of farming culture.3 This fear is not unfounded, as five major food
companies now nearly dominate the world's food supply.4  Today, genetically-
engineered seeds constitute a substantial portion of the modem global market. 5
Predictably, the expansion of the private seed industry caused an analogous
increase in the legal protections of seed 'germplasm' (the genetic composition of an
organism).
Despite the historical belief that the seed is a natural resource, recent legal
developments over the past century have taken extensive measures to protect seeds
that are altered or genetically modified by humans. Scholars and legislators alike
have attempted to strike a delicate balance: that of protecting the work product of
scientific minds and ensuring easy access to an important genetic resource.' The
task has not been a simple one.
Inherent in seed law is the idea that human manipulation of a germplasm 9
transforms a natural resource into a patentable human innovation.10 This idea leads
to three essential questions. First, if patent law protects intellectual creation, what
' Vandana Shiva, The Future of Food and Seed, VODPOD (Apr. 24, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-yYwOTLopWlw
2 See id.; David Kemker, Earthkeeper Hero: Dr. Vandana Shiva, MYHERO (Oct. 11,
2009), http://www.myhero.com/go/hero.asp?hero=Shiva.
' See id.
4 See Dan Morgan, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN: THE POWER AND PROFITS OF THE FIVE
GIANT COMPANIES AT THE CENTER OF THE WORLD'S FOOD SUPPLY (iUniverse, Inc. 2000)
(analyzing the five companies that dominate the grain trade of the common market).
s See Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, II CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L.247, 256 (2003) (stating, "Globally, in 2001, an estimated 130 million
acres of transgenic crops were planted by 5.5 million farmers, a more than thirty-fold
increase since 1996"); Catch Blackledge, Life Science Firms Will Make Money by
Controlling the Whole Food Chain, EUROPEAN, May 18, 1998, at 20 (explaining that Merrill
Lynch has estimated that the global market for genetically engineered seeds is around $6.6
billion).
6 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 249 (defining germplasm as "the complement of genes
that determine an organism's characteristics"); Blackledge, supra note 5, at 20; see also
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); JACK R. KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 152 (1988).
See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 5.
See, e.g., id.
See Aoki, supra note 5, at 249 (defining Germplasm as "the complement of genes
that determine an organism's characteristics.").
'0 See Kloppenburg, Jr., supra note 6; see also Aoki supra note 5, at 249.
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exactly is created through manipulation to justify patent protection?" The creation
of a particular seed, in its evolutionary entirety, cannot be fully attributed to the
work of any one human being. Legal and philosophical scholars postulate that
perhaps a "creation" occurs where human intervention causes specific alterations to
germplasm.12 Second, if the creation lies only in the human alteration of a seed,
what should the scope of ownership rights for that seed be?' 3 Is it possible to
accurately proportion ownership rights to reflect the amount of labor one individual
has contributed toward the final product? Finally, who can be rightly named the
inventor, to whom the patent confers ownership rights?' 4  If humans can be
considered inventors of any seed, the history of crop migration and prior
domestication by previous farmers or indigenous tribes obscures any clear lines of
ownership.
This paper discusses the scope of ownership for seeds that have been
selectively bred for traits or genetically modified. Even after thousands of years of
agricultural domestication, plant genetic code has never been viewed as a
commodity until the past century.'5 In the past, when a farmer harvested or
purchased a seed, she also gained the means to produce seeds for future seasons
through sexual reproduction.16  However, technology in the 2 0 th centuries has
allowed scientists to manipulate the seed on a genetic level to control its ability to
reproduce, as well as its growth cycles and physiological features.' 7 On the one
hand, such modification can produce substantial benefits, such as exponentially
increasing crop efficiency and output. On the other hand, the mass implementation
of genetically similar plants increases the risk of crop failure, due to what has been
termed "genetic vulnerability."'s Initially, the United States government heavily
subsidized foreign collection and improvement of germplasm.' 9 The government
later introduced legislation to protect both the intellectual work of agricultural
biotechnology companies and the genetic variety of agricultural plants, attempting




15 See id. at 250 (explaining, "Until recently, germplasm presented structural obstacles to
commodification [and] [t]echnologies such as hybridization in the early 20th century and
recombinant DNA, protoplasm fusion and cloning in the late 20th century have allowed
finely tuned human manipulation of germplasm on a molecular level.").
16 See id.
" See Leora Broydo, A Seedy Business: A New "Terminator" Technology Will Make
Crops Sterile and Force Farmers to Buy Seed More Often - So Why did the USDA Invent
It?, MOJO WIRE (Apr. 7, 1998), http://www.motherjones.com/newswire/broydo.html
(describing Terminator technology and the process by which plants are genetically modified
to be sterile).
" H. GARRISON WILKES, Plant Genetic Resources Over Ten Thousand Years: From a
Handful of Seed to the Crop-Specific Mega-Gene Banks, SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: TI-E USE
AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC MATERIAL, 73 (Jack R. Kloppenburg ed., 1988)
(hereinafter SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY) (providing examples of the possible catastrophes of
crop genetic vulnerability such as the wheat stem rust epidemic of 1954 and the southern
corn blight of 1970).
'9 See Janice M Strachan, Plant Variety Protection: An Alternative to Patents, PROBE
Vol. 2(2) (summer 1992), available at
http://www.nal.usda.gov/pgdic/Probe/v2n2/plant.html.
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to address both ends of the spectrum.20 As control over plant genetic resources
tightens, future legislation must continue to weigh the risk of creating a genetic
monoculture of crops against the benefits of providing property rights in modified
germplasm. Analyzing the past, present and future of seed patent law, it is clear
that a balance between the protection of intellectual property and maintaining
agricultural genetic health is a tenuous one.
I. PAST: THE COMMODIFICATION OF A NATURAL RESOURCE
a. Colonialism from the 16 'h to the 18 th Century
The flow of domesticated plants across the globe began with the advent of
international travel. 21 As different regions of the world became accessible by ship,
so began the migration of crop plants from different areas of the world. 22 Explorers
took plant samples from their travels back home and propagated a whole new food
23source for their home country. As Thomas Jefferson commented, "[tlo add a new
and useful plant is the greatest service you can render this new nation."24 After
Columbus brought maize, beans, potatoes, squash, sweet potatoes, cassava, and
peanuts to Europe from North and South America, 25 the world became increasingly
dependent on these newly introduced crops. 26 Furthermore, the seeds from these
crops proved a unique resource because a small amount could yield a great quantity
of product. 27
Some communities, however, became overly-dependent on the newly-
introduced agriculture, creating a food source open to the risk of genetic
vulnerability. 28  One of the most catastrophic examples of this vulnerability
occurred because of the narrowing of the genetic base of the Irish food supply. 29
England's introduction of one species of potato into Ireland facilitated a national
population increase from three million to eight million people. 30 However, the
resulting lack of genetic diversity in the Irish potato crop led to country-wide crop
failure because of the fungus Phytophthora Infestans.3 The Irish potato famine,
exacerbated by English political repression, 32 had devastating consequences,
20 See id.
21 See Wilkes, supra note 18, at 70-73.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 73.
24 See id. at 70.
25 See A.W. CROSBY, THE COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE: BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL
CONSEQUENCES OF 1492 (1972); Aoki, supra note 5, at 262
26 See Wilkes, supra note 18, at 73.
27 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 262 (explaining, '[..] the value of germplasm to the
colonial powers was not proportional to the physical amount taken."); see also Wilkes, supra
note 18, at 70.
28 See, e.g., Wilkes, supra note 18, at 70.
29 See id. at 73-75.
30 See id. at 75.
3 See id.
32 See PETER AND FIONA SOMERSET FRY, A HISTORY OF IRELAND, 231, 233-35 (1988)
(explaining, "What probably caused more resentment and despair than anything was the
sight of cartloads of grain and other food products being shipped over to England or
54 [Vol. 8: 1
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resulting in two million deaths and causing another two million Irish citizens to
emigrate in search of food and freedom.3 3
During this colonial period, newly discovered plant varieties were not
generally considered to be the possession of any one nation or people. 34 Imperial
powers freely took germplasm from around the world, and perpetuated the new
crops in their colonies around the world. The new crops delivered a wealth of
agricultural resources to the European nations, and resulted in significant
population increases. This open exchange created the very agricultural crops that
most of the world depends on today.3 7
b. Government Subsidy from the 1 9 'h to the Early 2 0th
Century
The United States government recognized the importance of establishing
an agricultural foundation early on." In 1819, the U.S. Treasury Department
ordered consular and navy officials to collect germplasm across the globe.3 9 This
action caught the attention of the Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.). 40 In 1836,
the P.T.O. began implementing a federal repository for germplasm samples in the
form of seeds or cuttings from abroad. 41 By 1857, the P.T.O. had constructed a
garden to propagate the foreign germplasm for the purpose of widespread
distribution.42  Because cultivated plants lacked patent protection, private
entrepreneurs were not necessarily motivated to invest in selective breeding
techniques. 43 However, the P.T.O. arranged to send foreign seed specimens to
farmers across the nation.44 This seed distribution program allowed farmers to
selectively breed new germplasm, screening for only the variations that succeeded
elsewhere from healthy Irish fields while Irishmen, Irishwomen and Irish children starved
and slid into slow and premature death because the potato had failed."); Peter Behrens, 'The
Famine Plot: England's Role in Ireland's Greatest Tragedy' by Tim Pat Coogan and 'The
Graves are Walking: The Great Famine and the Saga of the Irish People' by John Kelly,





" See id.; see Wilkes, supra note 18, at 75.
34 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 263.
" See id.
36 See id. (explaining that the new crops provided abundant and cheap food to all
classes in Europe.)
31 See id.
38 See id. at 264.
39 See id.; see also Conrad Zirkle, PLANT HYBRIDIZATION AND PLANT BREEDING IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURYAMERICA, AGRICULTURAL HISTORY, Vol. 55, No. 1, 25 (1969).
40 See Zirkle, supra note 39, at 25.
41 See id.
42 See NORMAN KLOSE, AMERICA'S CROP HERITAGE: THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN PLANT
INTRODUCTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 29 (Iowa State College Press, 1950).
43 See id
4 See id.; see also Aoki, supra note 5, at 266-67.
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in the local climate and region.45 In this way, American agriculture incorporated
the genes of foreign seeds. 46
Government action in the late 19th Century encouraged more commercial
farmers to propagate the freely distributed seeds. The 1862 Morrill Act established
Land Grant Colleges, which encouraged agricultural education and research.47 In
1887, the Hatch Act instituted a formal system of seed distribution throughout the
nation.48 In addition to government seed distribution, commercial farmers also
began to trade seeds widely among themselves. 4 9 In response, the nascent private
seed industry voiced concern that free seed distribution was crippling its
commercial business.5 0 In 1883, the private industry formed the American Seed
Trade Association and began lobbying the government to halt its free seed
distribution.5' The government finally responded in 1924 by discontinuing its seed
distribution program, explaining that the private seed industry was more efficient
than government efforts and that plant breeding had evolved into a science that
required legal protection.52
c. Plant Hybridization in the Early 2 0 th Century
While the private seed industry was occupied with efforts to eliminate
governmental seed distribution, public plant breeders began experimenting with
hybridization to increase genetic variability.5 3 Reviving Mendelian genetics, these
plant breeders transformed plant breeding from an art to a science by selecting and
cross-breeding plants with particular traits (increased crop yield, blight-resistant,
pesticide-resistant, etc.). 54 Congressional approval of the Purnell Act of 1925 and
the Bankhead-Jones Act of 1935 provided increased funding for the U.S
Department of Agriculture to expand hybrid-crop programs.ss
In the 1930s and 40s the hybrid corn industry evolved into a highly
successful enterprise. 56 Prior to this discovery, corn farmers were suffering from
unstable yields due to drought, insects, and diseases, which affected open pollinates
more than hybrids.57 The hybridized corn variety yielded a significantly higher
45 See Wilkes, supra note 18, at 76.
46 See Kloppenburg, Jr., supra note 6, at 56.
47 See JiM HIGHTOWER, HARD TOMATOES, HARD TIMES 8 (1973).
48 See id.; Aoki, supra note 5, at 266.
49 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 266.
s0 See FREDERICK H. BUTTEL & JILL BELSKY, Biotechnology, Plant Breeding and
Intellectual Property - Social and Ethical Dimensions, OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES, 110 (Vivien Weil & John W. Snapper eds.
1989).
" See id.; Aoki, supra note 5, at 267.
52 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 267 (explaining that the American Seed Trade
Association achieved their goal of stopping the government seed distribution program in
1924).
1 See id. at 267-68.
54 See id.
5 See id at 271-73.
56 See LEONARD STEELE, The Hybrid Corn Industry in the United States, MAIZE
BREEDING AND GENETICS 29, 29 (D.B. Walden ed., 1978).
" See id. at 3 1.
56 [Vol. 8: 1
output, with a smaller requirement for land.5 By 1965, over 95% of land devoted
to corn crops was planted with high-yield hybrid seed. 59 The success of the hybrid
corn reinvigorated private seed industries to continue carving out a bigger niche for
the private industry.
The antagonist relationship between the private seed industry and the
government slowly led to a complete separation of the two over the next few
decades.60 In the 1940s, the interests of the governmental Land Grant Colleges and
the private seed industry often came into direct conflict, especially in the area of
hybrid corn.6 However, due to the efforts of organizations such as the
International Crop Improvement Association and the American Society for
Horticultural Science, the boundary between the public and private sectors became
even wider.62 Private-sector spokesmen effectively encouraged public breeders to
focus on developing in-bred plant lines while giving the private sector the power to
decide how to combine those inbred lines to create hybrids. 63 Thus, publicly-
funded seed research became limited to producing only the 'raw' materials from
which the private industry used to create a useful hybrid seed product.6
d. US Patent Law: Subject Matter, Novelty, Utility, and Non-
Obviousness
As the seed industry continued to transition from art to science, patent law
and the seed industry began to increasingly overlap.65 Patent law protects new and
useful inventions, manufactures, and compositions of matter and processes that are
reduced to practice.66 To acquire a patent, an invention must meet the requirements
of novelty,67 utility,68 non-obviousness, 69 and subject matter.70  While both
mathematical formulae and laws/products of nature have been viewed as
unpatentable, 7 1 an individual may be able to patent a natural product if she isolated,
s8 See id.
s' See Kloppenburg, Jr., supra note 6, at 91.
60 See id. at 106-08.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 109.
61 See id. at 108-109 (noting that "private corn breeders successfully argued that
public funds should not be used to pursue activities that attract private investment, that
public duplication of private efforts was wasteful, and that a reorientation of public effort
would free resources for training and basic research.").
' See id. at 109-10.
65 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 276.
66 See id; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303-04 (1980); Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65-66 n.2 (1972); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-
Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (examining the non-obviousness
requirement for patents).
67 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
6 8 See id. § 101.
69 See id. § 103 (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
'0 See 35 U.S.C. § 101-103, 115-116.
7 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972); Funk Bros. See Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
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purified, or altered the form of that natural product.72 A patent grants the right to
use, make or sell the invention, and to exclude potential patent infringers, for
twenty years from the patent date.73 Once a patent has expired, information that
would enable others skilled in the art to make or use the invention is available to
others, encouraging a free exchange of ideas in the public domain.74
This legal protection was extended to the science of seed design beginning
in the early 2 0 th century. As the private seed industry developed, so did the demand
for patent protection of hybridized germplasm. Congress reacted by
implementing the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (P.P.A), which provided patent-like
protection to asexually reproduced plants with the exception of tubers (e.g.
potatoes). Obtaining a protection under the P.P.A. was significantly easier than
obtaining a utility patent, as an applicant needed only show that the asexually
reproduced plant was new and distinct.7 7  Sexually-reproduced plants, such as
hybrid crops, were excluded from protection because of heavy reliance on staple
hybrid-crops. The Plant Patent Act of 1930 indicated an early trend toward
privatization of the seed industry.
A second Congressional action increased patent protection of seed lines in
the late 2 0 th Century.
79 Due to continued efforts by plant breeders to amend the
P.P.A., Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (P.V.P.A) to
extend patent-like protection to sexually-reproduced seed lines.80 Although this
amendment was unsuccessful, statutory protection of sexually-reproduced plants
was finally attained through the P.V.P.A..8 Under the P.V.P.A., a patent applicant
could obtain protection seventeen years from the date of issue 82 if the seed line met
new requirements of novelty, uniformity, and stability.8 3 However, the Act also
attempted to find a balance between the rights of plant breeders and those of
farmers.84 The Legislature included a "brown-bag" exception that permitted
farmers to save, plant, and resell seeds to neighboring farmers,8 5 even if the seeds
72 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); Merck & Co. v. Olin
Mattheison Chemical Corp, 253 F.2d 156, 163 (1958).
1 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
74 See In re Lundak, 733 F.2d 1216, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (encouraging access to
information that enables the public to make and use the invention once the patent issues).
7 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001); see Aoki, supra note 5, at 280.
76 See Strachan, supra note 19; see also S. REP. No. 315-71, at 4 (1930).
" See S. REP. No. 315-71, at 4 (1930). But see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (stating
that a utility patent requires that the invention be useful, novel and non-obvious).
7 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 280.
7 See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2010); Kloppenburg, Jr., supra note 6, at 139.
'o See Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in
Furtherance ofInnovation Policy, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 105, 121 (2005) (citing 7 U.S.C. §
2402 (clarifying that "The PVPA confers intellectual property on '[t]he breeder of any
sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has
so reproduced the variety')).
8' 7 U.S.C. § 2402.
82 See id. §2543.
8 See id. § 2402; Strachan, supra note 19.
8 See 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
85 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 283.
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were otherwise protected by the P.V.P.A. . Although Congress eliminated the
resale exemption in 1994, the Act is still in effect today and has been a major
contributing factor to the widening division of labor between government and
private industry."'
II. PRESENT: SEED WARS
Given the rapid expansion of the private seed industry in the last few
centuries, it is not surprising that a variety of legal battles have arisen.
Agrichemical giants, such as the Monsanto Company, have brought a multitude of
infringement suits against farmers using patented or legally protected seeds." At
the same time, many farmers and lobbyists have rallied to overturn what they deem
to be overly-exclusive monopolies on staple crops. 89 They argue that widespread
genetically-homogenous crops increase the risk of massive crop failure, create
detrimental cross-pollination with wild species, cause allergic reactions, heighten
resistance to plant anti-biotics, decrease nutritional value, and lead to herbicide and
pesticide over-use.90
a. Recent Domestic Cases in Seed Law
Both the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of
1970 instigated a series of litigation involving the patent protection of germplasm.9 1
Simultaneously, major judicial decisions involving patent law held implications for
utility patents in plant germplasm. 92  These landmark cases revolutionized
intellectual property and redefined the boundaries of patent-worthy material.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the U.S. Supreme Court extended patent
protection to living organisms, signifying a momentous shift in patentable subject
matter. 93 The case involved the patenting of a bacterium that had been genetically
engineered to break down crude oil.94 A patent examiner had rejected Ananda
86 See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (stating that farmers have the "Right to Save Seed" to the
extent that such seed saving does not constitute an infringement under subsections (3) or (4)
of section 111).
87 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 286 (explaining that governmental varietal seed releases
ultimately ceased completely in the 1980s).
88 See Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, T-1593-98 (March 29, 2001), available
at http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2001/2001fct256.html.
89 See Wilkes, supra note 18, at 13 (listing public interest groups and
nongovernmental organizations which have "lobbied against plant breeders' rights and the
inequities of contemporary plant germplasm exchange.").
90 See id.; Elain Ingham's Testimony (Executive Summary) before the (New Zealand)
Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, February 2001, available at
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/-rone/GEessays/Ingham.htm; see also David Gutierrez, Doctors
Warn About Dangers of Genetically Modified Food, NATURAL NEWS (Feb. 2010), available
at http://www.naturalnews.com/028245_GMfood side effects.html; Jeffrey M. Smith,
Genetically Modified Foods Unsafe? Evidence that Links GM Foods to Allergic Responses
Mounts, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Nov. 2007), available at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context-va&aid=7277.
91See Aoki, supra note 5, at 286-04.
92 See id.
9 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980).
94 See id.
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Chakrabarty's patent application because the current law dictated that living
organisms were not patentable subject matter. 95 However, in a 5-4 decision, Chief
Justice Warren Burger held that the organism constituted patentable subject matter
because human intervention was a necessary step, signifying that the bacterium did
not occur naturally. 9 6 This emphasis on scientific handiwork permitted a broad re-
envisioning of patent law and opened the door to patents on many other life
forms. 97
In the wake of Chakrabarty, the possibility of obtaining a utility patent on
a living organism caused some confusion concerning whether it preempted or ran
concurrent with the P.V.P.A. or the P.P.A. 98 Inventors of modified germplasm
preferred the broader protection of utility patents over of the P.V.P.A's certificates
of protection, causing a drastic increase in utility patent applications.99 However,
for the next five years, the Patent & Trademark Office rejected all such utility
patent applications for germplasm covered under either the Plant Variety Protection
Act or the Plant Patent Act, arguing that legislative history showed that Congress
intended to treat plants separately.100
The P.T.O. responded to this dilemma in Ex Parte Hibberd, clarifying that
neither the P.P.A. nor the P.V.P.A. precluded inventors from applying for a utility
patent.1oi In this case, the P.T.O. had rejected Dr. Hibberd's application for a
utility patent on a maize line selected from a tissue culture he developed. 102 The
P.T.O. reasoned that utility patents are justifiably preferred because they offer
greater legal protection.1 03 It further explained that an invention that otherwise met
the requirements for novelty, non-obviousness, and usefulness should not be
precluded from obtaining a utility patent.104
In 1995, the Supreme Court again shaped the scope of seed patent law by
limiting the rights of the end-user: the farmer. 05  In Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, Asgrow Seed Co. sued the Winterboers for infringement of their
certificate of protection under the P.V.P.A. because the Winterboers were making
significant income from sales to neighboring farmers at well below the market
price.10 6 The Supreme Court attempted to determine whether the P.V.P.A's vague
"brown bag" provision permitted a farmer to resell seeds to other farmers only in
the amount that would be required to replant his own fields. 0 7 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia sifted through the provision's ambiguous language and held




9 See Stephen A. Bent, Protection of Plant Material under the General Patent
Statute: A Sensible Policy at the PTO?, 4 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 105 (1985).
9 See id.
' See id.
101 See id.; Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985).
102 See Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 443-445.
103 See id.
'0 See id.
1s See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1995).
'0 See id. at 182.
'0 See id. at 186-88.
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not for marketing purposes. os The court then determined that the legislative intent
behind the brown bag exception was to allow a farmer who has purchased seed for
her acreage, and subsequently changed her mind, to resell that quantity of seed to a
neighboring farmer. 09 Beyond just setting a limit on the brown bag exception,
Asgrow also signified that large seed companies were beginning to focus on the
activities of their clients rather than their competitors.
These three cases significantly altered the arena of seed law. Chakrabarty
and Hibberd established that inventors may obtain utility patents for plants,
regardless of the applicability of the Plant Patent Act or Plant Variety Protection
Act. Asgrow then extended the P.V.P.A.'s protection by curbing the reach of the
brown bag exception."o Given this shift toward increased legal protection, over
1,800 patents in plant germplasm were granted by the P.T.O. after Hibberd."' This
rise in patent activity led to rapid development in the field of genetic
engineering.11 2 Scientists were soon able to genetically tweak crop species by
inserting herbicide-resistant genes or eliminating the crop's ability to produce
seeds."' These scientific advances catalyzed a new barrage of lawsuits involving
the 'theft' of these patented modified genes."14
In 2001, the Canadian Supreme Court held that a Canadian farmer had
infringed on a Canadian utility patent held by Monsanto Canada, Inc. in Monsanto
Canada, Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser."5 Monsanto's utility patent covered a modified
germplasm resistant to the herbicide, Roundup M ."6 These so called "Roundup
Ready" seeds were sold to farmers wishing to use the herbicide to eliminate all
plants except the Roundup-resistant crop purchased from Monsanto." 7  This
technology was so successful that by the year 2000, it constituted 94% of global
land dedicated to genetically modified seeds. However, such technology came at
a price. Farmers who purchased ROUNDUP-READYTM seed were required to sign
a contract that forbade them from any seed-saving practice obligating them to
repurchase seeds from Monsanto every season.119
108 See id. at 187.
'09 See id. at 189.
"o See id. at 191-92.
.. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001), aff'g
200 F.3d 1394 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Aoki, supra note 5, at 289; Haley Stein, Intellectual
Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States, Trade, and the Developing
World, 3 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 166 (2005).
12See Aoki, supra note 5; Rudolf E. Hutz, Patent Protection for Living Organisms, 5 Del.
Law. 30, 33 (1986); see also; ETC Group, 2001: A Seed Odyssey, RAFI COMMUNIQUE, 1-2
(April 11, 2001), available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/269/01/com_2001.pdf.
113 See ETC Group, supra note 112, at 6.
114 See Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902; J.E.M., 534
U.S. at 124.
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In the Schmeiser case, canola farmer Percy Schmeiser argued that his
neighbors' Roundup Ready canola fields unintentionally fertilized his crop. 120 The
resultant outcrossed canola seeds were resistant to Roundup as well, and Schmeiser
continued to use these hybrid seeds in subsequent seasons. 121 Despite Schmeiser's
insistence that the theft was unintentional, the Canadian Supreme Court held that
Schmeiser had infringed on Monsanto's patent.122 The court reasoned that
Schmeiser must have been aware he was using Roundup Ready crops because he
continued to propagate and use the Roundup Ready crops after apparently spraying
three acres of his field with Roundup. 123 The case remains controversial today, as it
constitutes a significant milestone in the move toward heightened patent protection
of germplasm.
This steady trend of increased patent protection has been upheld in
subsequent litigation.124 In 2001, JE.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l,
Inc. challenged the legality of the holding in Hibberd.125  Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc. alleged that a small seed supply company, Farm Advantage, had
infringed on their patent by purchasing and reselling Hi-Bred's hybrid seeds. 12 6
Farm Advantage responded by challenging the legitimacy of the extension of utility
patents to plants in Ex Parte Hibberd.12 7 Farm Advantage argued that the P.T.O.
acted without express Congressional approval because the explicit protection
provided by both the P.P.A. and the P.V.P.A. indicated that Congress intended to
exclude plants from utility patents.128
Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, holding that both Hi-Bred's utility
patents and the extension of utility patents to plants were legitimate. 129 He rejected
Farm Advantage's argument that plants were excluded from utility patents by
emphasizing the evolution of both the law and the technology in this matter.' 30
Justice Thomas explained that in the time that the P.P.A. and the P.V.P.A. were
written, two reasons precluded plants from full patent protection. 31 First, plants
were considered to be products of nature.' 32 Second, the requirements for written
description were more stringent, making it more difficult to meet for advancements
in plant science. 3 3 Justice Thomas stated that both of these factors were no longer
valid reasons.134 Since Chakrabarty,135 the distinction between patentable and




23 See id. at 92.
124 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 124
(2001).
125 See id. at 131-132.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id.; Aoki, supra note 5, at 298.
129 See JE.M, 534 U.S. at 124; STEPHEN BRUSH, FARMERS' BoUNTY: LOCATING CROP
DIVERSITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (2004).
13 0 See J.E.M, 534 U.S. at 125.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 125, 134.
' See id. at 134.
13 See id. at 134-35.
'3 See id. at 134.
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agency.'6 Furthermore, the writing requirement has relaxed since the P.P.A. and
the P.V.P.A., making it easier for plant scientists to satisfy this condition. 137 Justice
Thomas has been criticized for side-stepping the otherwise credible argument that
Congressional intent indicates excluding plants from utility patents. However,
Pioneer Hi-Bred did serve to fill the legal gap left by Chakrabarty and Hibberd,
and clarified that utility patents and the PVPA are not mutually exclusive.139
b. International Approaches to Seed Law
In addition to developments in North America, seed law also gained
momentum in the international arena.140 Global controversies sparked over the
acquisition of germplasm in "gene-rich"l 4 1 countries in the southern hemisphere.142
Further confusion arose regarding the implications of Chakrabarty worldwide and
the extension of plant utility patents issued by the United States.' 43  This
uncertainty spawned several key international conventions and agreements, which
attempted to address these issues.' 44
In the early 1980's, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) became a popular forum for international discussion on plant genetic
resources.145  These efforts focused on the debate between the southern and
northern hemisphere.14 6  Southern countries voiced concern that industrialized
"gene-poor" northern countries were siphoning "gene-rich" germplasm within their
borders without compensation. 147 They contended that northern countries, like the
U.S., were acquiring, patenting and profiting from hybridized or genetically
modified products.148
In 1983 the FAO adopted the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources (IUPGR), a nonbinding agreement that set out a framework for the
international exchange of seeds and plants.149 This effort proved both hollow and
controversial, as it used vague terminology favoring developing countries in the
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See ICTA analysis of Supreme Court decision in patent case, CROPCHOICE.COM
(Dec. 19, 2001) http://www.cropchoice.com/leadstrya594.html?recid=540; see also JE.M,
534 U.S. at 147 (J. Breyer dissenting).
"9 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 304.
140 See Scott Holwick, Developing Nations and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1999 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49, 61
(2000).
141 See Keith Aoki, Seeds of Dispute: Intellectual-Property Rights and Agricultural
Biodiversity, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 105-07(2009) (explaining that gene-rich
countries provide the most genetic diversity in terms of plant species).
142 See id. at 107.
143 See id. at 102-04.
'" See id. at 105-23.
145 See id. at 105; see also F.A.O. Res. 8/83, U.N. F.A.O., 22d Sess. (Nov. 5-23,
1983).
146See Aoki, supra note 141, at 105.
147 See id. at 107.
148 See id.; Holwick, supra note 140, at 61 (describing how FAO Assistant Director-
General Obaidulla Khana called U.S. plant patents "biopiracy").
149 See Holwick, supra note 140, at 61.
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Third World.' The IUPGR treated germplasm broadly as the "common heritage
of humankind" and argued that commercial plant varieties should be freely
accessible to farmers around the globe.1 5 '
The IUPGR also sought to redefine "raw" material, which was freely
accessible, and "worked" material, which was commodified and required
purchase.152 Historically, countries within the southern hemisphere placed no claim
on the copious amounts of 'raw' plant or seed exports.' 5 3 Countries in the north
would then 'work' this exported seed into a product that receives both legal
protection and profit.' 54 However, since the creation of gene banks, this flow has
actually reversed. 1 So-called "gene-rich" countries in the southern hemisphere
have become the major importers of germplasm from supposedly "gene-poor"
industrialized countries of North America and Europe.' 5 6  For example, the
Svalbard Global Seed Vault, in the Norwegian island of Spitsbergen, is funded
entirely by the Norwegian government and provides storage free seed storage and
access to germplasm through the depositing gene banks.' 5 7  Thus, it was
problematic to characterize either hemispheres as gene-rich or gene-poor.1
Because of these complications, and because of disagreement between
industrialized and developing nations, progress on the IUPGR came to a halt. 5 9
After the stalemate following the IUPGR, the international community
made a second attempt at consensus during the Keystone Dialogues of 1990.160
International stakeholders in genetic resources met in Madras (now Chenai) in an
attempt to reduce conflict and encourage dialogue. ' Both developing and
industrialized countries were able to agree on three principles.' 62 First, the parties
recognized valid intellectual property rights by agreeing that protected plants were
150 See Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89
IOWA L. REV. 495, 583 (2004).
... See id. (explaining that the Undertaking represented a rejection of seeds as private
property).
152 See Holwick, supra note 140, at 60-62.
153 See id.
154 See id.
15 See CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE Loss
OF GENETIC DIVERSITY 8 (1990); see also CARY FOWLER, UNNATURAL SELECTION:
TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS AND PLANT EVOLUTION xiii (1994).
156 See FOWLER, supra note 155, at 185.
1 See Svalbard: Global Seed Vault, THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/lmd/campain/svalbard-global-seed-
vault/history.html?id-489075 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012); see also The history of The Vault,
Valbard: Global Seed Vault, THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/lmd/campain/svalbard-global-seed-
vault/history.html?id-489075 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
15 See FOWLER, supra note 155.
19 See Aoki, supra note 141, at 109.
160 See THE KEYSTONE CTR., FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE KEYSTONE
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE SERIES ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES: MADRAS PLENARY
SESSION 7-8, 11 (1990) [hereinafter KEYSTONE FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT].
I6I See id.; see also FR in the Keystone Dialogues, FARMER'S RIGHTS: RESOURCE
PAGES FOR DECISION-MAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS,
http://www.farmersrights.org/about/frhistorypart3.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
162 See KEYSTONE FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 160, at 7-11.
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not freely accessible.163  Second, they conceded that although plant genetic
resources may be "the common heritage of mankind," that did not equate to free of
charge.164 Third, the Keystone Dialogues generally recognized the existence of
farmers' rights and the centuries of farming that led to modem domesticated
crops.165 Although the agreement did not produce monumental changes, these
dialogues represented the nascent stages of agreement regarding international seed
law.
In 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was held to
further international discussion.' 66  The convention addressed the ecological
concerns of waning plant biodiversity and deforestation, but did not focus on
germplasm as a food source.' 67  To deter these dangers, the CBD suggested a
scheme of economic compensation for developing countries that protected their
biodiversity as a global resource. 68  The convention also concentrated on the
implications of Chakrabarty's grant of legal rights over living organisms, the
North-South divide over germplasm distribution, and the technological advances in
seed science.169 For the first time in legal history, countries around the world
concurred that the conservation of biological diversity is a common global
concern. 17 The CBD therefore differentiated itself from prior international
conventions by officially recognizing plant intellectual property rights already in
place and by emphasizing the need to acquire informed consent before exploiting a
nation's natural resources.
With the international recognition of expanding intellectual property
rights, industrialized and developing countries met at the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 to discuss the future of
intellectual property in international trade.172 At the end of the conference, 125
16 See id.; see, e.g., Aoki, supra note 5.
64 See KEYSTONE FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 160, at 7-11; KIRIT K.
PATEL, FARMERS' RIGHTS OVER PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES IN THE SOUTH: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 97
(F.H. Erbisch & K.M. Maredia eds., 2d ed. 2004).
65 See KEYSTONE FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 160, at 23.
6 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992), available at
www.eoearth.org/article/Convention on BiologicalDiversity [hereinafter CBD].
167 See id. at article I (stating "The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in
accordance with its relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic
resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights
over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.")
168 See id. at article 14; Ranee K. L. Panjabi, Idealism and Self-Interest in
International Environmental Law: The Rio Dilemma, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 177, 190-91
(1992).
169 See Aoki, supra note 141, at 115; see, e.g., CBD, supra note 166, at articles 2, 8, 9,
12, 16-19.
'7o See CBD, supra note 166, at 822.
171 See id.
172 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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countries had signed the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) administered by the World Trade Organization.' The
binding treaty required signatory states to strengthen their intellectual property
rights in various ways.174 For example, patents must be granted in all technological
fields and must extend for 20 years.175 Furthermore, TRIPS required member
countries to accord all other legal protection, like that of the P.V.P.A., which was
already in place in a number of nations.'76 Thus, since TRIPS became effective,
plant genetic resources are protected in the international context either by patents or
by an effective sui generis system.' 7 7
In addition to TRIPS' focus on intellectual property rights, the most recent
international movement in seed law sought to reaffirm farmers' rights. 7 1 In 2004,
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (ITPGR) furthered the efforts
of the FAO's 1983 IUPGR by explicitly recognizing farmers' rights.' 79  The
revision incorporated the subsequent 1992 CBD, which conflicted with the
IUPGR's definition of "common heritage." 80 The agreement recognized farmers'
rights by protecting traditional knowledge, equitable benefit sharing, and farmer
participation in national decisions on plant genetic resources.'"' However, it did
avoid addressing the controversial right to use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed
by deferring to the autonomy of each individual nation.182  By creating a
multilateral system, the ITPGR proposed to distribute germplasm with the
condition that no claim be made on any intellectual property right to that sample. 83
However, any gene, lines, cells, or compounds derived from that sample could be
protected.184 While the ITPGR proved more comprehensive than the 1983 IUPGR,
little effort was made to actually enforce farmers' rights.' 85
III. FUTURE: POTENTIAL APPROACHES To GERMPLASM
In the face of the apparent trajectory toward commodification, some
scholars have recognized several alternative approaches to germplasm. These
proposals range from treating germplasm as purely private property (complete
commodification) to a blanket prohibition of any legal claims (non-
173 See id.; Aoki, supra note 141, at 118.
174 See TRIPS, supra note 172, at 85, 86.
1 See id. at 96.
176 See id. at 84-85.
177 See id.
178 See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,
(Nov. 3, 2001) available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i05lOe/iO5lOe.pdf at 11-12
[hereinafter ITPGR].
179 See id.
180 See id.; Gregory Rose, International Law of Sustainable Agriculture in the 21"
Century: The International treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 15
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 583, 594 (2003) (explaining that the CBD defined plant genetic
resources as sovereign property).
181 See Rose, supra note 180, at 594.
182 See Aoki, supra note 141, at 122; ITPGR, supra note 178, at 13, 20, 26, 29.




commodification).186 One comprehensive approach, proposed by Professor Shubha
Gosh and adopted by Professor Aoki, applies four models of legal protection for
traditional knowledge: (1) the "Public Domain" Model, (2) the Trust Model, (3) the
Commercial Use Model, and (4) the Private Property Model.'" 7 In addition, it is
also possible to create hybrid models that balance the costs and benefits of more
than one approach. The "Open Source Software Movement" approach constitutes
such a hybrid, balancing the Public Domain Model and the Private Property model
and providing limited ownership as well as access rights to encourage technological
participation.'88 These five models suggest alternative approaches to seed law that
the judicial and legislative branches may take in the future.
a. "Public Domain" Model"
The formal intellectual property model or public domain model would
treat germplasm as a raw material that is not owned but still appropriable.'
89
Industrialized nations, such as North America and Europe, have taken this approach
to traditional knowledge.' 90  Essentially, natural materials are considered the
common heritage of mankind and are 'free' to be collected by anyone.' 9 ' The
alternative may give rise to severe complications in the international economy. For
example, if 'raw' material had a monetary value, whoever "takes" that material
would owe a debt to the individuals or governments where those materials
originated.' 92
As Jack Kloppenburg indicates in The Political Economy of Plant
Biotechnology, privatizing the public domain would result in a startling
redistribution of global wealth.193 Kloppenburg points to various examples where
American crops benefited enormously from the genetic contributions of countries
or groups of people.194 First, Turkish wheat provided American wheat varieties
with genetic resistance to stripe rust.195 This contribution is estimated to be worth
$50 million per year.196 The American sorghum crop acquired a resistance to green
bug from a similar Indian species, yielding a yearly monetary benefit of $12
million.197 An Ethiopian barley crop gene provided American barley crops with
protection from yellow dwarf disease, a savings valued at $150 million per year.
186 See id.
87 Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM J. AsIAN L.
108-20, 90 (Fall, 2003); see Keith Aoki, "Free Seeds, Not Free Beer": Participatory Plant
Breeding, Open Source Seeds, and Acknowledging User Innovation in Agriculture, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2293 (2009).
88 Aoki, supra note 187, at 2293.
89 See Ghosh, supra note 187, at 112-15.
190 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 318; Ghosh, supra note 187, at 112-13 (explaining that
the term 'public domain' provides that traditional knowledge or intellectual property is freely
accessible to everyone).
191 See Ghosh, supra note 187, at 112.
192 See Aoki, supra note 187, at 2293.
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As a final example, soybean germplasm from Korea was utilized to decrease
processing costs of American soybean crops by $100-500 million.1 99 In sum, if the
"public domain" of seed germplasm were to be treated as a private resource, the
United States would owe billions of dollars across the globe.
The complications of keeping track of seed exchanges between countries,
in both the past and present, make it unlikely that the public domain model will
disappear. Furthermore, preventing access to germplasm by constructing a fiscal
barrier may disadvantage the global population. The country or group of
individuals to whom the raw materials 'belong' may not have the resources or
desire to cultivate different varieties of crops. Such a barricade might prevent the
free experimentation that, as described above, resulted in enormous agricultural
advances.
b. Trust Model
The second approach described by Professor Ghosh, the Trust Model,
assigns rights of traditional knowledge to groups other than the community from
which it originated.200  In this model, seed germplasm would be treated as
communal property controlled by a group of "trustees" for the benefit of the
"beneficiaries." 201 This group of trustees would most likely be a government or
non-governmental organization, which would then have the power to grant or deny
individual access to germplasm.202 The Convention for Biological Diversity
suggests designating the government as the trustee. 203 This would require devising
a royalty framework, and would distribute royalties among the community from
which the raw materials come from.
This model introduces several advantages and disadvantages. It is
certainly advantageous to designate an authority with sufficient knowledge and
power to manage the "trust" for beneficiaries who may lack such skills. 204
However, attributing sole power to any party, public or private, runs the risk of
exploitation of a public resource by the political elite. 205 As Professor Ghosh aptly
states, "[...] one's view of the trust model depends heavily on whether one 'trusts'
the trustee."206
199 See id
200 See Ghosh, supra note 187, at 117-18.
201 Id. at 109, 117-18.
202 See id. at 117.
203 See CBD, supra note 166, at article 15 (explaining that "the authority to determine
access to genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national
legislation.").
204 Ghosh, supra note 187, at 38.
205 See id.
206 Id. at 39.
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c. Commercial Use Model
Another approach to traditional knowledge is the Commercial Use Model,
which designates ownership rights to any party who commercially used the 'raw'
material.207 In the context of seed law, this approach would provide rights to
anyone who made an improvement upon a crop variety that exists in nature. 208if
traditional communities could demonstrate they had altered a crop to increase its
commercial success, they could assert rights of ownership. 209 However, this does
not prevent outside parties from claiming similar ownership rights for improving
upon a crop's commercial success. 210 The Commercial Use Model could therefore
result in overlapping ownership rights.
This model also causes ambiguities regarding the definition of
"commercial" and some general confusion as to the chronology of
improvements.21 Difficulties can arise in proportioning ownership where a
scientist is credited with genetically modifying a crop that a local community
cultivated for centuries. 212 What portion of credit is due to the communities whose
traditional knowledge has altered improved upon crops for generations? Is this
contribution considered sufficiently 'commercial'? The answer to these questions
is, at the moment, untenable. 213
Similar to the Trust Model dilemma, the Commercial Use Model also
exposes a local community to potential exploitation by those more knowledgeable
in economics, bargaining, and contracts.2 14 Furthermore, those who claim
ownership rights through commercial use will most likely not contribute proceeds
to the benefit of the public, as in the Trust Model. Therefore, while the Trust
Model operates under the assumption that a neutral party distributes rights and
benefits for the public good, the Commercial Use model provides only benefits to
215
those with economic interests.
d. Private Property Model
In contrast to the previous three models, the private property model
provides more ownership rights to the traditional knowledge community.216 This
approach views traditional crops not as 'raw' material, but as a product of human
207 Id; see Aoki, supra note 5, at 319.
208 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 319.
209 See id
210 See id.
211 Id; see, e.g., MICHAEL R. DOVE, Center, Periphery, and Biodiversity: A Paradox
of Governance and a Developmental Challenge, VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 57 (1996).
212 See id.
213 See Rosemary Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the
Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 113 (1998).
214 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 320.
215 See id.
216 See id at 321; see Coombe, supra note 213, at 91-93, 99, 109.
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ingenuity designed by local farmers.217 Those wishing to use the germplasm of
gene-rich geographical areas would be required to either purchase or license the
material from local communities.2 18 Unlike the Trust Model and the Commercial
use Model, the Private Property Model would provide some amount of autonomy
and self-protection against exploitation by other nations or industries. 219 However,
these ownership rights might simply be sold to the highest bidder, which would still
result in a concentration of germplasm ownership in developed countries.220
e. "Open Source" Model
As a compromise between the Public Domain Model and the Private
Property Model, Professor Keith Aoki proposed an alternative licensing scheme
based on the principles of the "Open Source Software Movement." The Open
Source Software Movement began in the early 1990s with the development of the
GNU/Linux operating system.2 IA software programmer named Linus Torvalds
began building on Richard Stallman's GNU program, eventually leading to the
222GNU/Linux operating system. Development of this software began to pick up
speed because the operating system was distributed without cost under a General
223Public License. This promoted a massive programming collaboration, which
added other functionalities to the operating system that benefited both user and
inventor. The license was also "viral," meaning that if one downloads a copy of the
software, that individual is bound by its terms.224 This essentially 'private'
alternative to 'public' copyright law encouraged cooperative and rapid
technological development in the community. 225
Applying this approach to seed law, a party who has developed a
particular germplasm could acquire ownership rights, gain royalties from selling
General Public Licenses, and permit modification to subsequent buyers. 226 An
open source software model would encourage improvement upon previously
developed hybrid or genetically-modified crops while simultaneously encouraging
genetic diversity.227 Farmers would be re-envisioned as both users and developers
of information technology.228 Farmers that participate in this cooperative process
could also share their success easily using a similar "viral" General Public License
217 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 321.
218 See id. at 322.
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See Aoki, supra note 187, at 2295.
222 See id. at 2295.
223 See id.; GLYN MooDY, REBEL CODE: THE INSIDE STORY OF LINUX AND THE OPEN
SOURCE REVOLUTION 26-28 (2001).
224 See sources cited supra note 223.
225 See YOCHAl BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 64-67 (2006).
226 See Aoki, supra note 187, at 2295.
227 See id.
228 See Ravi Srinivas Krishna, Innovations, Commons and Creativity: Open Source,
Bio Linux and Seeds, WACC, http://www.waccglobal.org/lang-en/20031-intellectual-
property-rights-and-communication/653-Innovations-commons-and-creativity-Open-Source-
Bio-Linux-and-Seeds.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
70 [Vol. 8: 1
as in Open Source Software that would automatically bind users by its terms. 229
This approach could show just how necessary increased seed law protection is to
-230incentivize innovation.
CONCLUSION
From a natural resource to a highly protected product of science, the seed
germplasm has undergone many transformations in the last few centuries. With the
discovery of new countries in the colonial times, developing nations began an era
of open germplasm exchange. This exchange led to the fruitful production of
innumerable lines of crops that exhibited higher yield and resistance to deadly
diseases. A drastic rise in the financial value of these crops led to a corresponding
increase in patent or patent-like protection. In addition, Chakrabarty transformed
the world of intellectual property in the U.S. by permitting the patenting of living
things. The monumental case opened the door to plant patents, and a flood of
litigation ensued.
In response to the implementation of domestic legal protection, numerous
global conventions attempted to secure an international agreement on the matter.
These discussions attempted to strike a balance between intellectual property rights
for germplasm, the rights of the source state, and the rights of farmers. Thus far,
only an unsteady recognition of all three rights exists.
In the future, the government, the legislature and the judicial branch should
consider using the four models of traditional knowledge, or a fusion of more than
one of these models. The public domain model, the trust model, the commercial
use model, the private property model, or a fusion model (such as the open source
software movement model) present a comprehensive framework for future seed law
concerns. Furthermore, a plurality of models could be considered to permit
flexibility in the unpredictable future. Undoubtedly, seed law will undergo many
more transformations before the world can agree on how to protect such a valued
resource.
229 See Margaret Kipp, Software and Seeds: Open Source Methods, FIRST MONDAY
(Sept. 5, 2005),
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1276/1196.
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